26 ideas
14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
14023 | The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM] |
14024 | Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM] |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
14021 | Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
14020 | 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM] |
14026 | Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM] |
14022 | The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM] |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |